Boko Haram had announced the group's pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State on 7 March 2015, therewith aligning itself with the IS in the global Jihadist movement. The IS welcomed the news and promptly accepted a pledge of allegiance to the group, according to an audiotape purportedly from its spokesman.
"We announce to you to the good news of the expansion of the caliphate to West Africa because the caliph... has accepted the allegiance of our brothers [..]” – IS spokesman Mohammed al-Adnani said in the message. However, this video appearing on IS-affiliated websites could not be authenticated.
Although the nature of exact links between the two armed groups are still unclear, it can be confirmed that their ideologies and operations show similarities, despite some remaining differences.
(Source: www.dw.com) |
The ideology of the two armed groups
The ideology of both groups is based on a premodern theological tradition that wants the establishment of a sharia state. Both groups oppose moderate Muslim ideas and attack followers of a moderate form of Islam.
The IS identifies with a movement in Islamic political thought known as Jihadi-Salafism, or jihadism for short. Jihadi-Salafism is a distinct ideological movement in Sunni Islam.
The Islamic State’s version of Jihadi-Salafism is predicated on an extremist reading of Islamic scripture that is also textually rigorous, deeply rooted in an archaic theological tradition, and elaborated on by a recognized cadre of religious authorities. The group’s ideology stipulates that all Muslims must associate exclusively with fellow “true” Muslims and dissociate from anyone not fitting this narrow definition; failure to rule in accordance with God’s law constitutes unbelief; fighting the Islamic State is tantamount to apostasy and all Shi‘a Muslims are apostates deserving of death.
Boko Haram’s ideology shows a lot of similarity to the above. While the group’s world view is often described as opposition to democracy and rejection of Western-style education, its theology and politics encompass more than hatred for Western influence. Its worldview combines two broader ideas – first, a religious exclusivism that opposes all other value systems, including rival interpretations of Islam, and second, a politics of victimhood in response to what it sees as a decades-long history of persecution against Muslims in Nigeria.
It is important to know that Boko Haram arose from intra-Muslim competition as well as narratives of grievance against the state and Christians. Its leaders have consistently used religious rhetoric in an attempt to justify the sect’s brutality, score-settling, and provocations. They have also consistently used extremely narrow criteria to define who counts as a Muslim.
Boko Haram’s ideology is a spill over from the Sunni-Salafi doctrine that the "temporal proximity to Prophet Mohammad is associated with the truest form of Islam''. The group appears to openly associate with the Sunni-Salafi jihadis who call for the use of violence to ensure a return to the original form of Islam, and the rejection of everything deemed un-Islamic.
How they use social media
The IS’s use of social media to spread propaganda, announce actions and recruit people is well known. In January 2015, Boko Haram also launched its official, Arabic-language Twitter feed, and since then, there have been multiple signs that the group's media operation has been influenced by the Islamic State. Boko Haram has followed the example of IS by publishing branded photographs of its militants and the areas under its control to illustrate its successes on the ground. The Twitter feed has also been posting a stream of short statements about the group's activities, claiming operations in a timely manner, in the mould of the Islamic State's one-line tweeted claims. The videos via the new Twitter account have been created with professionally designed graphics and high-quality opening sequences, similarly to IS that works with a lot of IT professionals to spread its message.
Source: www.thetimes.co.uk |
Furthermore, the use of multiple languages and well-presented subtitles - using English, Arabic, French and Hausa - suggested the group may have had outside help from IS media operatives. Among the Arabic-language jihadist anthems appearing in the footages, there is one which has been routinely used in IS propaganda.
For its part, Boko Haram has included excerpts from IS leadership messages in its own propaganda videos.
In spite of the above, there has been no official evidence of media collaboration between the two groups, and while the signs of cooperation have been compelling, they remain inconclusive.
But is there any difference then?
The IS is seen as a threat to the West, including Europe and the US. With its expansion to Libya, this threat has become even more imminent for the EU and it has triggered concentrated efforts from both sides of the Atlantic to eradicate it as soon as possible.
The numerous attacks conducted within the territories occupied by the IS that targeted foreign individuals - such as the 2015 attack in Tunisia, Sousse, when a gunman killed at least 38 people at a beachfront hotel - and the targeting of people within Europe, can showcase the danger the IS pose to the West. An example for the latter is the 2016 Brussels bombings that entailed two suicide bombings in Brussels Airport and one bombing in Brussels Metro, which resulted in more than 30 deaths and more than 300 wounded.
However, in spite of its pledged alliance with the IS, Boko Haram is still considered a local problem in Central-Africa, which only takes local hostages and kills African people. It doesn’t pose any direct threat to the West.
Despite its successful attack on the UN compound in Abuja in August 2011, Boko Haram is not bent on attacking Western interests. There have been no further attacks on international interests since that time.